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Does access to finance improve household welfares? 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
In this paper we develop an econometric framework to analyse the effect of access to credit 
on the economic welfare of households in Vietnam. Our findings confirm that household 
credit contributes positively and significantly to the economic welfare of households in terms 
of per capita expenditure, per capita food expenditure and per capita non-food expenditure. 
The positive effect of credit on household economic welfare is observed regardless of whether 
they are poor or better-off households. We also find that credit has a greater positive effect on 
the economic welfare of poorer households and find that the age of the household head, the 
household size, land ownership, and savings and the availability of credit at village level are 
key factors that affect household borrowing. Some policy implications are drawn.  
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1. Introduction 
It has been well postulated that the provision of financial services to the poor, or 
microfinance1, is a powerful means of providing low income households with the chance to 
escape from poverty and to transform their lives. It is also evident that there is a strong 
demand for small-scale commercial financial services – both credit and savings – from low-
income households (see, for example, Beck 2015; Robinson, 2001 for comprehensive review). 
The strong demand for financial services by low income households, together with the 
evidence that access to credit reduces household poverty, provides clear incentives for policy 
makers to develop a framework for providing financial services to low-income households.  
As many studies have shown, by providing low-income households with access to 
financial services, the service providers help them improve their productivity and 
management skills, create jobs, smooth income and consumption flows, enlarge and diversify 
their businesses, and increase their income and other benefits, such as health care and 
education. The various evidence supporting this assertion can be found from a variety of 
empirical study around the world (Beck, 2015).  
Pioneer research studies that find the positive impact of access to credit on household 
welfare include Khandker (1998, 2001, 2003), Pitt and Khandker (1998), Coleman (2002) etc. 
More recent studies continue to show the link, such as findings from Karlan and Zinman 
(2010), Augustburg et al (2014), Angelucci, Karlan, and Zinman (2015), Banerjee et al (2015) 
.etc. Moreover, it is also well documented that microfinance programs do not serve the 
poorest, but when they do so, the poorest can benefit from microfinance through increased 
income and reduced vulnerability (Morduch and Haley, 2002). There is also some evidence 
that the degree of poverty may affect the response. Better-off poor households have a larger 
positive response than the very poor (Coleman, 2002). 
                                                 1 Microfinance is defined either narrowly as microcredit or broadly as microcredit plus micro savings, micro insurance, pre and post loan technical trainings and business supports. In this paper, we use the term microcredit for narrow microfinance to distinguish against broad definition of microfinance. 
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With respect to Vietnam context, there are a number of research papers that look at 
this literature and find some mixed findings on the impact of credit on household welfare. For 
example, Lensink and Pham (2012) find a positive impact of access to credit and of the 
accumulated amount of credit on self-employment profits in Vietnam. Nghiem et al (2012) 
conduct a quasi-experimental study on households of microfinance programmes by NGOs and 
find that there are no significant impact of participation on household welfare proxied by 
income and consumption per adult equivalent. Doan et al (2014) suggest that formal credit has 
positive impact on education and healthcare spending while the informal credit does not. 
Another research by Barsland and Tarp (2008) examines the use of credit and find that formal 
credit is used mostly for production and asset accumulation while formal credit is for 
consumption smoothing. 
 Paramount among the limitations of the existing studies is the absence of a coherent 
econometric methodology that would make empirical findings easily comparable. The key 
methodological problem with most research studies is the issue of sample selection bias 
(Heckman, 1979) in which the household characteristics may well affect both the probability 
of access to credit and the ability to achieve better welfares. Differences in research 
methodology seem to account for differences in research findings.   
The objective of this paper is to propose and implement an econometric framework 
which seeks to overcome the shortcomings of the research methodology employed in previous 
studies. In addition, the paper seeks to obtain evidence on the impact of credit on household 
economic welfare in rural areas in Vietnam. Specifically, the paper addresses two questions: 
(i) the determinants of household borrowings in rural Vietnam and (ii) the impact of 
household borrowing on household economic welfare. The data used for this paper are from 
the two Vietnam Household Living Standard Surveys taken in 1992/1993 and 1997/1998 (for 
simplicity purpose, we will call it Survey 1 and Survey 2 respectively). We use these samples 
simply for the reason that they are the first and the only two surveys that are implemented 
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with assistance from international organizations which are more comprehensive to cover 
better the rural areas across Vietnam. 
 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 develops the 
econometric framework. We discuss the characteristics of data in section 3. In the following 
section, we present and discuss our test results. The concluding section summarizes the main 
findings of our paper and draws policy conclusions.  
2. The model 
We consider a simple two-period economy in which there are two sets of actors: households 
and the lenders. We assume that households finance their economic activities by borrowing 
from the lenders. The impact of borrowing during the period is expected to occur at the end of 
the period and to affect household economic welfare. For simplicity, we look at household i in 
location j at time t. During the period from t-1 to t, this household would have a demand for 
credit Cdijt. However, household demand for credit is constrained by the supply of credit Csijt. 
While the demand depends on household characteristics, the supply of credit depends on the 
availability of funds and the lender’s characteristics. The household borrowing function is 
jointly determined by demand and supply functions, denoted as Cijk. During the period from t-
1 to t, the household generates its economic welfare, which is observed at time t and denoted 
as Yijt. The figure below illustrates our approach. 
… t-1 t 
 
Demand function Cdijt-1 
Supply function Csijt-1 
Borrowing function Cijt-1 
At t-1:  
Observed economic welfare Yijt-1  
Observed borrowing Cijt-1 
From t-1 to t: 
Demand function Cdijt 
Supply function Csijt 
Borrowing function Cijt 
At t: 
Economic welfare Yijt 
Observed borrowing Cijt 
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For the purpose of assessing the impact of credit on household economic welfare, an 
output supply function is employed in which we introduce credit as a separate explanatory 
variable in the welfare function. Household welfare may be reflected in income and 
expenditure indicators, etc. At the household level, the welfare is most likely to be affected by 
the household characteristics such as the age of household head, the education of household 
head, total farming area, etc. At village and commune levels, household welfare is possibly 
affected by the characteristics of the village and commune in which the households live. For 
example, the prices of selected goods and services in the village and commune may affect 
household expenditure or income. We recognise those characteristics as the local market 
characteristics. Household welfare is also affected by household and local market 
characteristics that we cannot observe or measure. For instance, households exerting more 
effort may generate higher income. The controlling variables therefore include household 
characteristics, local market characteristics and unobservable characteristics. The household 
welfare function takes the structural form, as follows 
ijtwijcijtijtijtijt WCXXY   ''' 2211      (1) 
where X1, X2 and W are vectors of household characteristics, local market 
characteristics and unobservable characteristics, respectively. Y and C represent household 
welfare and total household borrowing. The estimation of parameter c would show the effect 
of credit on the household welfare.  
There are, however, some concerns about the equation (1). Firstly, is it appropriate to 
use the total household borrowing? If C represents borrowing from a specific source (e.g. 
controlled program or borrowings from one type of lenders), the parameter c may not be 
consistent. Specifically, a household may borrow from a bank and from a moneylender or 
whatever. Then, if we consider the effect of bank loans on household welfare and find c, it is 
less convincing to conclude that c shows solely the effect of bank borrowings since it is 
possible that household welfare results from the borrowings from the moneylender. Therefore, 
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the use of total household borrowings should be better than the use of borrowings from a 
specific source. 
Second, is the total household borrowing an exogenous variable in equation (1)? To 
answer this question, we consider a function of household borrowing which results from the 
interaction between demand and supply function. Note that the econometric literature on the 
identification problem (see Greene, 2003; Manski, 1995; for examples) shows that identifying 
separate demand and supply functions of household credit from a sample of households is 
impossible without further information about either demand or supply. However, this is not 
our purpose in this paper. We consider neither the demand nor the supply of household credit, 
but the function of household borrowing for a representative household. One may think of our 
approach as identifying the factors that determine the quantity of credit that a typical 
household may receive. Consequently, the understanding and interpretation of determinants of 
household borrowing should take into account both the demand and the supply side. 
The household demand for credit depends on a number of observable factors, such as: 
household characteristics, local market characteristics, etc. Examples of household 
characteristics may include the gender of household head, the education of household head, 
the ownership of farm land, the initial endowment, etc. Local market characteristics may 
include the prices of selected goods and services, average education levels, farm landowning 
levels etc. It is also likely that the unobservable characteristics of household and local market 
affect household demand for credit. These types of variables may include the human effort 
and dedication etc. Hence, the demand function takes the general form: 
ijtddwijddijtdijtdijtd WXXC   ''' 2211       (2) 
where X1 is a vector of household characteristics; X2 is a vector of local market 
characteristics; and Wd is a vector of unobservable characteristics of households and the local 
market. 
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Similarly, the supply of credit depends on the lenders’ characteristics, local market 
characteristics and some unobservable characteristics. The lenders’ characteristics may 
include the type of lender, such as formal or informal, the availability of funds, the allocation 
pattern of funds and the competition between lenders etc. Local market characteristics may be 
the same as in the credit demand function. The unobservable characteristics may include 
valuation of the lender based on, for example, the average effort and dedication to work by 
households in a specific market. The supply takes the form: 
ijtsswijssijtsijtsijts WXXC   ''' 2233       (3) 
where X3 is a vector of lenders’ characteristics; X2 is a vector of local market 
characteristics; and Ws is a vector of unobservable characteristics of households and the local 
market which correlates with supply of credit.  
In theory, the demand and supply of credit would determine the amount and price of 
credit granted to a representative household. However, the credit market is special. The 
existence of asymmetric information may lead lenders into the problems of adverse selection 
and moral hazard (Alkelof, 1970). One solution to these problems is for the lenders to tailor 
their loan contract covenants, which may act as a screening device to distinguish borrowers 
(Bester, 1985; Bester, 1987). Another solution is for the lenders to ration credit (Stiglitz, 
1981). For these reasons, the function of household borrowing may result not only from pure 
demand and supply functions but also from variables controlling for asymmetric information 
problems, such as collateral, interest rates, availability of funds and competition amongst 
borrowers etc2. The reduced form of household borrowing function therefore should be 
estimated as follows:  
ijkccwijccijkcijkcijkcijk WXXXC   '''' 3322110     (4) 
                                                 2 Khandker (2001,2003) discusses this issue but our setup is slightly different. 
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where X1 is a vector of household characteristics; X2 is a vector of local market 
characteristics; X3 is a vector of lender’s characteristics and Wc is a vector of unobservable 
variables. 
Now we look at the equations (1) and (4). We may see that with a cross sectional data 
i.e. households are observed at only one point of time (i.e. at the end of the observed period), 
it is likely that the unobservable characteristics of household and local markets, Wc in 
equation (4) and W in equation (1), are correlated, so that the estimate of Y based on (1) could 
result in biased coefficients. More specifically, because of unobservable characteristics of 
households and the local market, such as a household’s special effort and dedication, and the 
natural comparative advantages of the local market etc, it is possible that an increase in a 
household’s welfare is not the result of household borrowings but because of that the 
household has invested more effort or they live in a better location for farming, for example. 
Alternatively, the lenders may screen households using their characteristics. As a result, 
better-off households receive loans but better-off households may also be able to generate 
higher welfare outcomes. Therefore, the estimation of c based simply on the welfare 
equation (1) may not be consistent. 
Econometrically, the solution to the issue of endogeneity of credit is to employ 
instrumental variables and two-stage regression method. We first estimate the determinants of 
household credit, which include instrumental variables that will not be included in Equation 
(1), but can be used to predict the amount of household credit that does not depend on 
household characteristics. Selecting appropriate instrumental variables is therefore a crucial 
task as the instruments must not be correlated with household welfare but must be closely 
correlated with the amount of credit borrowed. Given the existence of credit rationing in the 
market, the high demand and limited supply of credit in rural areas, what actually matters is 
the supply of credit. The instrumental variables must therefore be those which well describe 
the characteristics of the lender.  
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From the Equation (4), there are two sets of observable variables, of which we can see 
that the lender’s characteristics may serve as the instrumental variables. The lender 
characteristics influence the supply of credit and they do not directly affect household 
welfare. But which of these characteristics should be chosen? One may think the lending 
interest rate could be a good instrument as it describes the response of supply i.e. the amount 
of credit supplied. However, in rural Vietnam, because of the government restrictions on the 
lending interest rates, the “interest rate” can not serve as an instrument as it does not vary very 
much across the sample. The instrumental variables that we select include: the availability of 
funds; the credit allocation pattern; and the competition between lenders at commune and 
village levels. 
Hence, in the first stage, the household borrowing is estimated based on Equation (4) 
where lenders’ characteristics play the role of instrumental variables. The predicted values of 
household credit that are obtained from Equation (4) are then used, instead of actual values, in 
the second stage (i.e. Equation 1) to correct for the problem endogeneity of credit. The 
alternative option is to include both the actual values and the predicted residuals computed 
from the first stage (Equation 1) into the second stage regression (Equation 2). The coefficient 
of the predicted residuals in the second stage regression shows the Durbin- Wu –Hausman test 
(see more about this test in Greene, 2003), which indicates that whether or not the 
endogeneity of credit is significant and that the two-stage regression is appropriate. 
Having solved the problem of the endogeneity of credit, our next concern is about the 
selection of the sample. From a household survey, we can observe that there are a number of 
households who borrow and other households who do not. For a number of reasons, including 
credit rationing by the lenders, the non-borrowing households cannot get loans even they wish 
to do so. The allocation of credit therefore is not a random process. If we select only 
borrowing households and estimate the effect of credit on household welfare, the estimation 
may be biased. For example, the lenders select households because they are more credit- 
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worthy, but credit-worthy households may achieve higher welfare outcomes. Hence, the effect 
of credit on household welfare is not consistent. 
To control for sample selection bias, the whole sample, which includes both 
borrowing and non-borrowing households, should be used. The first stage regression using 
Equations (4) is then reconsidered as follows. For the purpose of convenience, we denote 
vector X = (X1, X2, X3) i.e. X includes household characteristics, local market characteristics 
and lender’s characteristics. The structural form of household credit function (4) therefore 
becomes: 
* 'i i iC X     with 2~ (0, )i iX N   
Econometrically, if we observe (Yi,Xi) for a random sample, the estimation of the 
coefficients β using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression produces a consistent estimation 
of , i.e.  
1 *ˆ ( ' ) ( ' )X X X C   
However, as we can observe only borrowing households, resulting in a random sample 
conditional on Ci* >0, the least squares regression may not be appropriate. The reason is as 
follows. Consider the following credit equation for every observation: 
[ , 0]i i iE c x c  = ' '[ ]i i i ix E x      '' [ ]ii xx E            
We assumed 2~ (0, )i iX N  , so we can arrange this equation for3: 
[ , 0]i i iE c x c  ' '( / )i ix x             (5) 
Equation (5) implies that a marginal effect of x’i on ci differs from  which results 
from the OLS regression, which is therefore not appropriate. A number of studies have 
proposed different methods to solve this problem using log likelihood function maximisation. 
We follow Tobin’s (1959) approach, which is then called the Tobit model4.  
                                                 3 See Appendix 1 4 See Appendix 2 
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3. Data and measurement 
Survey 1 covers a sample of 4,799 households, 150 communes and 300 villages over 
the country. In which, there are 3,839 rural households, accounting for 80% of the overall 
sample. Of the rural households, there are 1,985 households (41.4%) being indebted from 
various sources. Survey 2 was designed to provide an up-to-date source of data on 
households. It covers a sample of 5,999 households, 194 communes and 388 villages, 
including all households surveyed in Survey 1. The proportion of rural households is 71.2% 
(4,269 households). There are 38.9% of rural households borrowing from all sources. The 
timing of the second sample approximately five years after the first allows analysis of 
medium term trends in living standards. 
The construction of variables plays an important part in our study. The dependent 
variables, which proxy for household welfares, include per capita expenditure, per capita food 
expenditure and per capita non-food expenditure. The variable of total household credit is 
constructed by summing all loans from the formal and informal sources such as bank loans 
and loans from Rotating Savings and Credit Associations (ROSCA). The household 
characteristics include variables measuring natural attributes such as age, gender of household 
head; variables measuring household assets, such as savings and farm-land owning. Local 
market characteristic variables include: the prices of selected goods and services; the averaged 
household characteristics in a commune, such as averaged education, averaged farm-land 
owning. The construction of variables measuring local market characteristics is mainly for the 
purpose of controlling for the location fixed effects, rather than for comparison. The lender 
characteristics include proxy variables of the availability of funds at province, commune and 
village levels and the competition between lenders. The discussion of variables is in Section 
4. 
4. Econometric procedures and results 
In this section, we implement the tests and report the empirical evidence on the effect of 
household credit on household welfare. The first stage regression estimates the determinants 
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of household borrowing. The question that we want to answer in this stage is: what are the 
determinants of household borrowing? In other words, we are interested in exploring: (i) 
whether or not the natural attributes of a household affect its amount of borrowing; (ii) how 
the household’s endowment affects its borrowings?; and (iii) does the supply of loans by the 
lenders play any role on household borrowing?  
In the second stage, the predicted residuals resulting from the first stage are included 
as an explanatory variable to control for the endogeneity of credit in the estimation of 
household welfare. The questions that we will answer in this stage, are as follows: (i) is the 
household credit endogenous and is the two-stage regression appropriate?; (ii) what is the 
effect of household credit on household welfare?; and, (iii) is there any difference in the 
degree of effects between the two samples?.  
4.1 Determinants of household borrowing 
In the first stage, we use the Equation (4) and implement tests using the Tobit model. We 
select and implement the tests separately for two samples. After adjusting for missing data, 
the Survey 2 includes 4,101 rural household houses, of which 2,108 households are borrowing 
households. The Survey 1 includes 3,264 rural households, of which 1,733 households 
borrowed. The test results are reported in Table 1. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
The Survey 2 
Considering the test results for the Survey 2 from Table 1, we find that, of the natural 
attributes of households, the age of household head and the size of household are significantly 
related to total household borrowing at 1% level of significance. In Survey 2, the middle-aged 
households tend to borrow more than the other households. The household size is positively 
and significantly related to household borrowing, indicating either that larger-size households 
demand more loans, or that the lenders allocate more credit to households with more 
labourers. The gender of the household head and the dummy variable of whether a household 
is a farm household are not significantly related to household borrowing. This result indicates 
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that in rural areas there is no distinction between genders and type of households in 
demanding loans and the allocation of credit. 
The proxy variables for household assets are found to be significantly related to 
household borrowing. At the 5% level of significance, the education of the household head is 
positively and significantly related to household borrowing, implying that more educated 
households tend to borrow more than others. At the 1% level of significance, we find that the 
ownership of farming land positively and significantly affects the amount of household 
borrowing. This indicates either that the ownership of land is very important for gaining 
access to loans since the formal lenders normally require land use certificates as collateral for 
loans, or that households owning more farming land borrow more i.e. bigger farm need more 
money. Financial savings and non-financial savings are negatively and significantly related to 
household borrowings, at the 1% level of significance. This shows that the households with 
smaller endowments tend to demand more and borrow more. 
Our next concern is about whether or not the availability of funds (or the supply of 
credit) plays any role in household borrowings. To proxy for the availability of funds, we 
calculate the sum of all household borrowings by source at village, commune and province 
level. We then consider the availability of formal funds at village, commune and province 
level and the availability of informal funds at village level. At the 1% level of significance, we 
find that the availability of informal funds at village level, the availability of formal funds at 
village level and the availability of formal funds at province level are positively and 
significantly related to household borrowings. However, the availability of formal funds at 
commune level is negatively and significantly related to household borrowing at the 5% level 
of significance. The opposite signs of the effect of formal sources of credit at different levels 
may imply that in order to help rural households gain access to formal sources of credit, the 
network of formal lenders must be extended at the village level. The negative effect of the 
availability of formal credit at commune level possibly implies that where formal credit 
supply is restricted households may borrow more from informal lenders. The effect of the 
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availability of informal sources of funds at village level on household borrowing indicates that 
informal sources of credit remain important in rural credit markets.  
The Survey 1 
The findings from the Survey 1, as shown in Table 1, are similar and confirm the main 
findings from Survey 2. We find the negative and significant effect of the age of household 
head on household borrowing at the 1% level of significance. This result also indicates older 
households tend to borrow less. Household size is again positively and significantly related to 
household borrowing at the 1% level of significance. The gender of the household head and 
farm household variable are not found to be significantly related to household borrowings. 
Of the proxy variables for household assets, the ownership of farming land, the value 
of financial savings and non-financial savings are all significantly related to the total 
household borrowing, but we do not find evidence for the influence of the education of the 
household head. At the 5% level of significance, the positive effect of the ownership of 
farming land on the amount of household borrowings confirms the implication that we found 
in Survey 2 that households owning more land demand more loans for their production or that 
the lenders use land owning as a priority criteria for offering loans. At the 1% level of 
significance, the negative effects of financial and non-financial savings are relevant to 
previous findings that better-off households borrow less. 
Regarding the availability of funds and competition between lenders, at the 1% level 
of significance, we find similar results as in Survey 2 that the availability of informal funds 
and the availability of formal funds at village level are positively and significantly related to 
household borrowings. However, the availability of funds at the commune level is not 
significantly related to household borrowings. The findings again strengthen the view that for 
rural households to gain access to credit, its supply at the village level must be improved.  
4.2 Impact of credit on household welfare 
In the second stage of regression, we use the Equation (1) and conduct tests using ordinary 
least squares method. The predicted residuals that are resulted from the first stage have 
 15
included in the second stage to correct for sample selection bias and endogeneity of credit. 
We conduct separate tests for the two samples. Table 2 shows the Durbin-Hausman-Wu test 
which indicates whether or not the credit is endogenous and should the two stage regression is 
appropriate. Table 3 shows a summary of the tests of effect of credit on household welfares 
for the Survey 2 and 1, respectively. The test results are reported in Table 4 and 5. The 
dependent variables include the logarithm forms of per capita expenditure, per capita food 
expenditure and per capita non-food expenditure.  
[Insert tables 2 and 3 about here] 
From Table 2, at the 1% level of significance, the Durbin-Wu-Hausman tests show 
that the household credit is indeed endogenous for all dependent variables. Therefore, using 
instruments and analysing the role of credit on household welfares based on the two stage 
regression are appropriate. Briefly, at the 1% level of significance, we find that household 
borrowing is positively and significantly related to household welfares, in terms of per capita 
expenditure, per capita food expenditures and per capita non-food expenditure for both the 
Survey 2 and Survey 1, as shown in Table 3. We also find that in Survey 1, household 
borrowing contributes more to household welfares than in Survey 2. The effect of borrowing 
on non-food expenditure is found to be higher than on food expenditure in both Survey 2 and 
1. The effects on food and non food expenditures are lower in Survey 2.  
Although the findings show very small effects, they do reveal that household 
borrowing has a positive impact on household welfare5. This result supports the view that 
providing credit to rural households may increase their welfares and reduce poverty. The 
greater effect of credit on non-food expenditure in both samples possibly implies that 
households need to borrow to finance other activities, such as production and trading 
                                                 5 Econometrically, we may be concerned with standard errors when using two separate stage regressions, as discussed in Maddala (2001, pp. 360-363). As Maddala analyzes, although the two separate stages of regression may produce consistent coefficients, the standard errors may be incorrect, since, in the second stage, the predicted values are used instead of the actual values. If so, the interpretation of the test results may lead to different conclusions. To check this, we conduct extra tests using 2SLS estimator directly. The extra tests, however, do not contradict our findings. 
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business, rather than daily sustenance. However, further discussion and the correct policy 
assessment of the impact of credit needs to take into account cost and benefit analysis. 
4.3 The main implications 
In a short, our findings reveal some important implications. First, a schematic picture of a 
typical household which borrows in the rural Vietnam is presented. A typical household owns 
an area of farming land and borrows to finance its production because it lacks an endowment 
(i.e savings). The middle-aged and larger sized households tend to borrow more. The gender 
of household head and the type of household (i.e. form or non-farm household) however do 
not affect the amount of household borrowing. This snapshot shows that the households who 
borrow are those who lack endowments, but have land and labour. They indeed need loans for 
production. However, the amount of household borrowing is influenced by the availability of 
funds at the village level. This implies an important policy conclusion: in order for rural 
households to gain access to credit, the formal/semiformal credit network must be extended to 
the village level. 
Second, the positive impact of household borrowing on household economic welfare 
indicates that the provision of credit to rural households is an effective tool for improving 
their living standards. However, the very small values of the estimated coefficients raise the 
question of whether it is efficient to provide financial services to the rural households. The 
traditional view (Robinson, 2001)) on rural finance emphases that providing credit to rural 
households involves high risk and/or high transaction costs. If the costs are too high, one may 
question: (i) whether providing credit to rural households is good policy, and if it is; (ii) how 
should we provide financial services to them? This returns us to the debate of whether we 
should follow a subsidized poverty reduction approach or a market risk related approach 
aimed at achieving sustainability of financial services provision, which is well discussed in 
Robinson (2001).  
5. Conclusions 
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Although there has been substantial research on the relation between microfinance and 
household economic welfare, the research approach and methodology has been flawed. The 
main problems in the study of credit impact assessment include: the endogeneity of credit; 
and sample selection bias. In this paper, we have: (i) proposed an econometric framework that 
aims at minimising the above problems; and (ii) provided the empirical evidence on the role 
of household credit on household economic welfares with the case of rural Vietnam. 
We have found that household borrowing is affected by various factors, of which the 
following are important: the age of the household head, the household size, the ownership of 
farming land, the value of financial savings, the value of non financial savings, the availability 
of informal funds and the availability of formal funds at village level. The positive effect of 
the ownership of farming land implies either that the households owning more farming land 
tend to borrow more or that the lenders lend more to those households. This possibly 
demonstrates that the formal/semiformal lenders require rural households to provide collateral 
in the form of land use certificates. The negative coefficient of the value of financial savings 
and the value of non financial savings on the amount of household borrowing indicates that 
households with insufficient endowments (i.e. low savings) tend to borrow more to finance 
their production. We also found that the availability of informal and formal/semiformal funds 
at village level increases the amount of household borrowing. This finding has a very 
important implication that in order to help rural households gain access to the formal sources 
of credit, the banking network must be extended to the villages. 
   The main purpose of this paper is to assess the role of credit on household economic 
welfare. We have found that household borrowing is positively and significantly related to the 
household welfare in both samples. The similarity of finding for each of the two samples 
informally supports robustness tests. Although the effect is small, the finding implies that 
providing loans to rural households is a tool to help poor rural households escape from 
poverty. Moreover, we found that household borrowing has a greater positive impact on 
poorer households, compared with better-off households. This strengthens the view that 
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poorer households can potentially gain from access to formal/semiformal credit in particular, 
and financial services in general.  
However, we may be concerned about the very low impact of credit on household 
welfare. Given the high transaction costs of providing credit to rural households, the benefit, 
or the impact, may be lower than the cost, and hence the question is raised: should we provide 
credit on a risk-related, or a subsidized basis? The main case for subsidizing credit is to 
reduce poverty by supplying cheap credit, but, as we and many others have found (e.g. 
Khandker, 2003; Khandker and Faruque, 2003), the marginal of impact is low. Moreover, 
credit is not the only tool in a poverty reduction strategy, so why do we need to commit a 
cheap credit? The risk related approach, which aims at assuring sustainability of the providers, 
results in the supply of much more expensive credit to rural households and we may expect 
exclusion of the very poor households to result. We thus return to the debate of which is 
better: the risk oriented or the subsidized poverty alleviation approach? We leave this for 
future research. 
   
 19
References 
 
Akerlof, G. (1970), “The market for lemons: Quality uncertainty and the market mechanism”, 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 84, 488-500. 
Angelucci, Manuela, Dean Karlan and Jonathan Zinman (2015). “Microcredit Impacts: 
Evidence from a Randomized Microcredit Program Placement Experiment by 
Compartamos Banco”, American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, Vol. 7, 151-
82. 
Augsburg, Britta, Ralph De Haas, Heilie Harmgart and Costas Meghir (2014), “The Impacts 
of Microcredit: Evidence from Bosnia and Herzegovina”, American Economic 
Journal: Applied Economics, Vol. 7, 183-203. 
Banerjee, Abhijit V., Esther Duflo, Rachel Glennerster and Cynthia Kinnan (2015), “The 
Miracle of Microfinance? Evidence from a Randomized Evaluation”, American 
Economic Journal: Applied Economics, Vol. 7, 22-53. 
Barsland, M., and Tarp, F. (2008), “Formal and informal credit in four provinces of Vietnam”, 
Journal of Development Studies, Vol. 44, No. 4, 485-503. 
Beck, T. (2015), “Microfinance – A critical literature survey”, World Bank Working Paper, 
2015/4. 
Bester, H. (1985), “Screening vs. rationing in credit markets with imperfect information”, 
American Economic Review, Vol. 75, 850-855. 
Bester, H. (1987), The role of collateral in credit markets with imperfect information" 
European Economic Review, Vol. 31, 887-899. 
Coleman, B. E. (2002), “Microfinance in Northeast Thailand: Who benefits and How much?”, 
Working paper, Asian Development Bank, Economics and Research Department, No. 
9. 
Doan, T., Gibson, J., and Holmes, M. (2014), “Impact of Household Credit on Education and 
Healthcare Spending by the Poor in Peri-Urban Areas, Vietnam”, Journal of Southeast 
Asian Economies Vol. 31, No. 1. pp. 87-103 
Greene, W.H. (2003), Econometric Analysis (5th Edition), Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice 
Hall 
Heckman, J. (1979), “Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error”, Econometrica, Vol. 47, 
153-161 
Karlan, Dean and Jonathan Zinman. (2010), “Expanding Credit Access: Using Randomized 
Supply Decisions to Estimate the Impacts”, Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 23, 433-
464 
 20
Khandker, S. R. (1998) Fighting Poverty with Microcredit: Experience in Bangladesh, New 
York: Oxford University Press, Inc. 
Khandker, S. R. (2001). Does Micro-finance Really Benefit the Poor? Evidence from 
Bangladesh. Asia and Pacific Forum on Poverty: Reforming Policies and Institutions 
for Poverty Reduction, Manila: Asian Development Bank. 
Khandker, S. R. (2003), “Microfinance and Poverty: Evidence Using Panel Data from 
Bangladesh”, Working paper, World Bank Policy Research, No. 2945. 
Khandker, S.R., and R.R. Faruqee (2003), “The impact of farm credit in Pakistan”, Journal of 
Agricultural Economics, Vol. 28, 197-213 
Lensink, R., and Pham, T., T., T. (2012), “The impact of microcredit on self-employment profits in 
Vietnam”, Economics of Transition, Volume 20(1) 2012, 73–111 
Maddala, G.S. (2001), Introduction to Econometrics, Third Edition, John Wiley&Son, Ltd.  
Manski, C.F. (1995) Identification Problems in the Social Science, Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press 
Nghiem, S., Coelli, T., and Rao, P. (2012), “Assessing the Welfare Effects of Microfinance in 
Vietnam: Empirical Results from a Quasi-Experimental Survey”, Journal of Development 
Studies, Vol. 48, No. 5, 619–632, May 2012 
Pitt, M., and S., Khandker (1998), “The impact of group-based credit programs on poor 
households in Bangladesh: Does the gender of participants matter?”, Journal of 
Political Economy, Vol. 106, 958-995. 
Robinson, M. (2001) The microfinance revolution: Sustainable finance for the poor, 
Washington, DC: World Bank. 
Stiglitz, J., and A., Weiss (1981), “Credit rationing in markets with imperfect information”, 
American Economic Review, Vol. 71, 393-410. 
 21
Table 1: First stage Tobit Regression: Determinants of household credit The whole samples   Dependent variable : Total household credit (VND1000, Logarithm)   Survey 2   Survey 1 Explanatory variables Coefficients z-statistic Prob. Coefficients. z-statistic Prob. The age of household head  1.349238 2.743424 0.0061 -0.534680 -6.649445 0.0000 The age of household head squared -0.222313 -4.091714 0.0000    Education of household head (years) 0.074426 2.079463 0.0376 -0.004059 -0.111232 0.9114 Dummy variable: farm household =1; otherwise =0  -0.218607 -0.737600 0.4608 -0.222741 -0.736479 0.4614 Dummy variable: gender of household head: male =1; female=0 0.308263 1.041345 0.2977 0.215318 0.764030 0.4448 Household size (persons) 0.523353 8.092091 0.0000 0.434557 7.904087 0.0000 Farm land owned (Hectare, Logarithm) 0.231562 5.406392 0.0000 0.092318 2.212809 0.0269 Financial savings (VND1000, Logarithm) -0.216638 -4.325020 0.0000 -0.237987 -5.413677 0.0000 Non-financial savings (VND1000, Logarithm) -0.313294 -9.322477 0.0000 -0.221818 -6.282292 0.0000 Price of detergent in the village (VND1000/kg, Logarithm) -0.110967 -0.319148 0.7496 -0.017907 -0.054083 0.9569 Price of fish source (VND1000/bottle, Logarithm) -1.196459 -4.213158 0.0000 -0.382876 -1.445793 0.1482 Price of noodle (VND1000/pack, Logarithm) 2.887991 3.191280 0.0014 0.470643 0.639311 0.5226 Price of pork (VND1000/kg, Logarithm) 0.798256 0.815365 0.4149 0.081513 0.108388 0.9137 Price of normal rice (VND1000/kg, Logarithm) -1.209699 -1.243912 0.2135 -0.226098 -0.264794 0.7912 Price of sewing service (VND1000/trouser, Logarithm) 2.166007 4.950512 0.0000 0.310168 0.966095 0.3340 Averaged education in commune (years) 0.017579 0.209168 0.8343 -0.032988 -0.350469 0.7260 Averaged land owned in commune (Hectare, Logarithm) -0.248341 -1.000495 0.3171 0.151792 1.643362 0.1003 Price index in the region 5.121724 1.625574 0.1040 -9.186247 -2.677549 0.0074 Availability of informal funds in village (VND1000, Logarithm) 0.391335 8.247937 0.0000 0.881074 10.56694 0.0000 Number of households in commune 0.000433 1.435173 0.1512 -0.000145 -1.090582 0.2755 Availability of formal funds in province (VND1000, Logarithm) 0.292953 3.189332 0.0014    Availability of formal funds in commune (VND1000, Logarithm) -0.231167 -2.201784 0.0277 0.106379 1.369011 0.1710 Availability of formal funds in village (VND1000, Logarithm) 0.667861 7.758944 0.0000 0.272537 5.315236 0.0000 C -22.05987 -5.381328 0.0000 -0.658902 -0.172808 0.8628 R-squared  0.145800  0.122646 Adjusted R-squared  0.140771  0.116691 Log likelihood  -8284.762  -6489.587 Uncensored observations   2108   1733 Total observations   4101   3264 
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Table 2 – Results of Durbin-Wu-Hausman Tests    The whole sample Better-off households Poorer households  Survey 2 Survey 1 Survey 2 Survey 1 Survey 2 Survey 1 Dependent variable (Logarithm) t -sta. Prob. t-sta. Prob. t -sta. Prob. t-sta. Prob. t -sta. Prob. t-sta. Prob. Per capita expenditure -9.149071 0.0000 -7.650737 0.0000 -3.596091 0.0003 -2.176149 0.0297 -8.444651 0.0000 -5.173894 0.0000 Per capita food expenditure -6.002171 0.0000 -5.910136 0.0000 -2.780305 0.0055 -1.319384 0.1872 -3.107590 0.0019 -2.612428 0.0091 Per capita non food expenditure -11.14564 0.0000 -9.021461 0.0000 -2.979476 0.0029 -3.031199 0.0025 -10.94111 0.0000 -6.905298 0.0000   Table 3 – Effect of credit on household welfares   The whole sample Better-off households Poorer households  Survey 2 Survey 1 Survey 2 Survey 1 Survey 2 Survey 1 Dependent variable (Logarithm) Coeff. t-sta. Coeff. t-sta. Coeff. t-sta. Coeff. t-sta. Coeff. t-sta. Coeff. t-sta. Per capita expenditure 0.058897 10.76278 0.069796 8.594428 0.026106 4.016450 0.022210 2.993245 0.018306 3.268044 0.049039 5.273333 Per capita food expenditure 0.031550 6.596244 0.051011 6.560122 0.015926 2.590315 0.014053 1.768436* 0.124351 12.49764 0.027171 2.615912 Per capita non food expenditure 0.114328 13.29480 0.124194 9.877993 0.039319 3.753593 0.045279 3.783517 0.051041 9.501470 0.132783 7.017389 - Significant at 1% for all - * Significant at 10% 
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Table 4: Second stage Least Squares Regression: Effect of credit on household welfares Survey 2 – The whole sample   Dependent variable Per capita expenditure (VND1000, Logarithm) Per capita food expenditure (VND1000, Logarithm) Per capita non food expenditure (VND1000, Logarithm) Explanatory variables Coeff. t-statistic Prob. Coeff. t-statistic Prob. Coeff. t-statistic Prob. The age of household head  0.177633 7.306821 0.0000 0.141211 6.645651 0.0000 0.236982 6.203212 0.0000 The age of household head squared -0.011968 -4.495937 0.0000 -0.010793 -4.638587 0.0000 -0.013962 -3.337507 0.0009 Education of household head (years) 0.021521 11.73443 0.0000 0.011561 7.211788 0.0000 0.035329 12.25802 0.0000 Dummy variable: farm household =1; otherwise =0  -0.023968 -1.597689 0.1102 -0.024622 -1.877764 0.0605 -0.021334 -0.904948 0.3655 Dummy variable: gender of household head: male =1; female=0 0.001698 0.114598 0.9088 0.042384 3.272195 0.0011 -0.057059 -2.450155 0.0143 Household size (persons) -0.102083 -27.05984 0.0000 -0.095099 -28.84122 0.0000 -0.115973 -19.56257 0.0000 Farm land owned (Hectare, Logarithm) -0.011821 -5.475450 0.0000 -0.005308 -2.813256 0.0049 -0.019447 -5.732373 0.0000 Financial savings (VND1000, Logarithm) 0.058729 22.25537 0.0000 0.041436 17.96455 0.0000 0.086300 20.81076 0.0000 Non-financial savings (VND1000, Logarithm) 0.045339 23.76919 0.0000 0.025533 15.31461 0.0000 0.077134 25.73254 0.0000 Price of detergent in the village (VND1000/kg, Logarithm) 0.005053 0.288457 0.7730 0.025555 1.668933 0.0952 -0.032365 -1.175645 0.2398 Price of fish source (VND1000/bottle, Logarithm) 0.063933 4.294735 0.0000 0.048672 3.740697 0.0002 0.093392 3.992248 0.0001 Price of noodle (VND1000/pack, Logarithm) 0.081608 1.738382 0.0822 0.101111 2.464200 0.0138 -0.042754 -0.579544 0.5623 Price of pork (VND1000/kg, Logarithm) 0.406621 8.407764 0.0000 0.296651 7.017768 0.0000 0.520518 6.848926 0.0000 Price of normal rice (VND1000/kg, Logarithm) 0.210225 4.321962 0.0000 0.247643 5.824863 0.0000 0.204924 2.680927 0.0074 Price of sewing service (VND1000/trouser, Logarithm) 0.070426 2.987775 0.0028 0.007520 0.365022 0.7151 0.162953 4.399208 0.0000 Averaged education in commune (years) 0.011397 2.747349 0.0060 0.010979 3.027804 0.0025 0.020441 3.135507 0.0017 Averaged land owned in commune (Hectare, Logarithm) 0.058936 4.704746 0.0000 0.065031 5.939285 0.0000 0.063567 3.229086 0.0013 Price index in the region -1.925638 -12.36355 0.0000 -1.486674 -10.92062 0.0000 -2.830734 -11.56548 0.0000 Total household credit (VND1000, Logarithm) 0.058897 10.76278 0.0000 0.031550 6.596244 0.0000 0.114328 13.29480 0.0000 Predicted residuals -0.051599 -9.149071 0.0000 -0.029587 -6.002171 0.0000 -0.098780 -11.14564 0.0000 C 6.471063 31.34931 0.0000 6.224408 34.49953 0.0000 5.165934 15.92564 0.0000 R-squared  0.474517  0.385771  0.443598 Adjusted R-squared  0.471941  0.382760  0.440870 F-statistic  184.2145  128.1238  162.6414 Probability (F-statistic)  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 Observations   4101   4101   4101  
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Table 5: Second stage Least Squares Regression: Effect of credit on household welfares  Survey 1 – The whole sample   
Dependent variable Per capita expenditure (VND1000, Logarithm) Per capita food expenditure (VND1000, Logarithm) Per capita non food expenditure (VND1000, Logarithm) Explanatory variables Coeff. t-statistic Prob. Coeff. t-statistic Prob. Coeff. t-statistic Prob. The age of household head 0.090527 15.87109 0.0000 0.068599 12.56038 0.0000 0.137327 15.55116 0.0000 Education of household head (years) 0.025197 10.58782 0.0000 0.016105 7.067884 0.0000 0.041430 11.24481 0.0000 Dummy variable: farm household =1; otherwise =0  -0.150273 -7.622210 0.0000 -0.098088 -5.196055 0.0000 -0.234073 -7.668874 0.0000 Dummy variable: gender of household head: male =1; female=0 -0.021696 -1.186900 0.2354 0.018206 1.040173 0.2983 -0.095532 -3.375689 0.0007 Household size (persons) -0.078290 -18.48049 0.0000 -0.074983 -18.48536 0.0000 -0.088868 -13.54973 0.0000 Farm land owned (Hectare, Logarithm) -0.001443 -0.533001 0.5941 1.65E-05 0.006351 0.9949 2.70E-05 0.006436 0.9949 Financial savings (VND1000, Logarithm) 0.040729 13.67241 0.0000 0.032491 11.39107 0.0000 0.058051 12.58704 0.0000 Non-financial savings (VND1000, Logarithm) 0.036854 14.84336 0.0000 0.021212 8.922329 0.0000 0.063629 16.55315 0.0000 Price of detergent in the village (VND1000/kg, Logarithm) -0.111503 -5.218410 0.0000 -0.096806 -4.731683 0.0000 -0.126994 -3.838965 0.0001 Price of fish source (VND1000/bottle, Logarithm) -0.051007 -2.966216 0.0030 -0.059988 -3.643340 0.0003 -0.043821 -1.646044 0.0999 Price of noodle (VND1000/pack, Logarithm) -0.238041 -4.992694 0.0000 -0.166472 -3.646553 0.0003 -0.426246 -5.774601 0.0000 Price of pork (VND1000/kg, Logarithm) 0.297911 6.016148 0.0000 0.270648 5.708156 0.0000 0.357521 4.663510 0.0000 Price of normal rice (VND1000/kg, Logarithm) 0.082461 1.551289 0.1209 0.222024 4.362158 0.0000 -0.119833 -1.456118 0.1455 Price of sewing service (VND1000/trouser, Logarithm) 0.134822 6.573578 0.0000 0.032058 1.632429 0.1027 0.309711 9.753856 0.0000 Averaged education in commune (years) 0.017738 2.853165 0.0044 0.016384 2.752460 0.0059 0.023928 2.486101 0.0130 Averaged land owned in commune (Hectare, Logarithm) -0.005925 -1.014662 0.3103 -0.006104 -1.091577 0.2751 -0.011215 -1.240420 0.2149 Price index in the region 1.102585 4.867014 0.0000 0.700230 3.228127 0.0013 1.549224 4.417173 0.0000 Total household credit (VND1000, Logarithm) 0.069796 8.594428 0.0000 0.051011 6.560122 0.0000 0.124194 9.877993 0.0000 Predicted residuals -0.064254 -7.650737 0.0000 -0.047526 -5.910136 0.0000 -0.117299 -9.021461 0.0000 C 4.658843 18.72168 0.0000 4.903242 20.57829 0.0000 2.398795 6.226434 0.0000 R-squared  0.375452  0.245630  0.387949 Adjusted R-squared  0.371794  0.241211  0.384364 F-statistic  102.6397  55.59346  108.2218 Probability (F-statistic)  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 Observations   3264   3264   3264 
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Appendix 1 
 
[ , 0]i i iE c x c  = ' '[ ]i i i ix E x      '' [ ]ii xx E            
We assumed 2~ (0, )i iX N  , so we can arrange this equation for 
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( / )
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
    
Set '( / )ix   = ''( / )( / )ii
x
x
    , we then have 
[ , 0]i i iE c x c  ' '( / )i ix x      (5) 
 
Appendix 2 
 
Consider the distribution of C given X conditional on C>0: 
*
*
, 0 *
( )( ) 1 (0 )C XC X C C X
f c xf c x F x    
We then arrange for the distribution of the observed dependent variable:  
(1/ ) (( ' ) / )( ) 1 ( ' / )C X
c xf c x x
        
The log likelihood function is then constituted as a function of logarithm of sum of 
distribution function of all observed dependent variables with respect to β and . 
 2 2 ' 2 '21 1 1( , ) ln(2 ) ( ) ln 1 ( / )2 2n i i iiL c x x                 
 
The Tobit model is used to estimate the consistent parameters  and  by 
maximizing this log likelihood function by differentiating the above equation with 
respect to  and  and setting the derivatives equal to zero.  
 
